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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
TORTS - PSYCHIC INJURY - LIABILITY FOR NONFEASANCE OF
STATE OFFICERs.-Plaintiff sought damages for the wrongful death
of decedent resulting from fright, unaccompanied by physical impact,
which was caused by the threats of a convict who had escaped because
of the alleged negligence of New York State prison guards. In al-
lowing a recovery, the Court of Claims held the state liable because
of the failure of its agents to act affirmatively in the performance of
a governmental function. Williams v. New York, 204 Misc. 843,
126 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
Until recently, New York, as a sovereign, was immune from
liability for injuries resulting from the performance of its govern-
mental or corporate functions.' In 1929, however, by statute, New
York waived its immunity if liability arose from the "misfeasance or
negligence" of its agents or employees.2 Since the courts had strictly
adhered to the specific terms of the statute,8 it was broadened by
amendment in 1939.4 The state thenceforth assumed liability in ac-
cordance with the same rules of law applicable in litigation involving
individuals or corporations. 5
In view of this statutory extension of governmental liability, it
was held that the immunity of sovereign instrumentalities, whether
they be private institutions 6 or municipal corporations, 7 could no
1 Smith v. New York, 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920) ; Locke v. New
York, 140 N.Y. 480, 35 N.E. 1076 (1894); Lewis v. New York, 96 N.Y. 71
(1884).
2 Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 467. "The state hereby waives its immunity from
liability for the torts of its officers and employees and consents to have its lia-
bility for such torts determined in accordance with the same rules of law as
applied to an action in the supreme court against an individual or corporation,
and the state hereby assumes liability for such acts, and jurisdiction is hereby
conferred upon the court of claims to hear and determine all claims against the
state to recover damages for injuries to property or for personal injury caused
by the mnisfeas azce or negligeice of the officers or employees of the state while
acting as such officer or employee." (emphasis added).
3 See, e.g., Hinds v. New York, 264 N.Y. 525, 191 N.E. 547 (1934).
4 Laws of N.Y. 1939, c. 860; N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8. "The state hereby
waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and
consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of
law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corpo-
rations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article."
5 It must be noted, however, that the immunity of the sovereign had ex-
tended to claims based on the militia's negligence. In Newiadomy v. New York,
276 App. Div. 59, 93 N.Y.S.2d 24 (3d Dep't 1949), the court stated that although
the state agreed to be sued, it only recognized its liability in areas wherein the
individual or corporation would be liable. Since no private citizen is respon-
sible for raising a militia, no individual could be held liable for such a tort and
therefore neither could the state. The individual's only recourse was to petition
his state assemblyman or senator to submit a private bill authorizing an award
covering the victim's loss. To remedy this situation, the legislature expressly
gave the courts the power to hold the state liable for the negligence of the
militia. Laws of N.Y. 1953, c. 343.
6 Bloom v. Jewish Board of Guardians, 286 N.Y. 349, 36 N.E.2d 617 (1941).
7 Holmes v. County of Erie, 266 App. Div. 220, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243 (4th
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longer be asserted. It was reasoned that, once the state consented to
be liable, the subdivisions of the state, deriving their immunity from
it, likewise became liable.8 States and municipalities were apparently
subjected to the same duty of care applicable to individuals and cor-
porations. However, by reason of the intrinsic nature of a sovereign,
responsibility cannot always be determined by the same rules that
govern the activities of individuals and corporations.
In the state's performance of a corporate function, the general
rules of negligence are applied. The sovereign, or a subdivision
thereof, has been held liable for negligence of commission or omission
in the maintenance of highways,9 pools,' 0 parks 11 and sidewalks,12 as
well as in the operation of schools 13 and subways.14 Recovery has
also been allowed where the state's agents have injured persons or
property while performing a governmental function.' 5  The state has
also been held liable for the death or injuries of persons assaulted by
police officers,16 and for injuries resulting from the negligent main-
tenance of a firehouse.' 7
The courts have hesitated, however, to hold the sovereign liable
for its failure to act in its governmental capacity. Although the gen-
eral rules of care and duty have been applied in several decisions, new
criteria have been introduced. In decisions such as the instant case,
liability for failing to perform a governmental function was imposed
on the sovereign.' 8 Yet, where the state failed to perform a function
Dep't 1943), aff'd mem., 291 N.Y. 798, 53 N.E2d 369 (1944); see Bernardine
v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1945); Steitz
v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 54, 64 N.E.2d 704, 705 (1945); Koeppe v.
City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443, 445, 95 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (3d Dep't 1950).
8 See Steitz v. City of Beacon, supra note 7 at 54, 64 N.E.2d at 705; Holmes
v. County of Erie, .rupra note 7 at 221-222, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 244-245.
9 Canepa v. New York, 306 N.Y. 272, 117 N.E.2d 550 (1954); Nuss v.
New York, 301 N.Y. 768, 95 N.E2d 822 (1950); Trimble v. City of New
York, 275 App. Div. 169, 88 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Zd Dep't 1949).
10 Fedearowicz v. City of Amsterdam, 293 N.Y. 814, 59 N.E.2d 178 (1944).
21 Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E2d 441 (1952).
USee Gordon v. City of Albany, 278 App. Div. 233, 236, 104 N.Y.S.2d 736,
739-740 (d Dep't 1951) ; see also Berkson v. Village of Richfield Springs, 300
N.Y. 720, 92 N.E.2d 59 (1950); Loughran v. City of New York, 298 N.Y.
320, 83 N.E2d 136 (1948).
23 Steele v. Board of Education, 127 N.Y.L.J. 1253, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Mar.
28, 1952).
24Mezzotero v. City of New York, 270 App. Div. 849, 60 N.Y.S.2d 619
(2d Dep't 1946).
25 Warner v. New York, 279 N.Y. 395, 79 N.E.2d 459 (1948); Saari v. New
York, 282 App. Div. 526, 125 N.Y.S.2d. 507 (3d Dep't 1953) ; Ritter v. New
York, 204 Misc. 300, 122 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ct Cl. 1953).
'
6 Ferguson v. City of New York, 303 N.Y. 936, 105 N.E2d 628 (1952);
McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947) ; McCarthy
v. City of Saratoga Springs, 269 App. Div. 469, 56 N.Y.S2d 600 (3d Dep't
1945).
17 Williams v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
Is Williams v. New York, 204 Misc. 843, 126 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Ct. Cl. 1953);
Liddie v. New York, 190 Misc. 347, 75 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
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arising out of a duty owing to the general public, in contradistinction
to the duty owing to individuals, as not providing police 19 or fire
protection,20 or where public policy is best served by refusing to allow
a recovery,2 ' it has not been held liable. These decisions appear to
have been prompted by the fear of imposing on the state or munici-
palities crushing liability, and the resultant cessation of essential gov-
ernmental services. The rights of an injured party are thus limited,
so that these essential services may still be provided without over-
burdening the taxpayer.
It is curious to note that the Court, in the instant case, did not
allow the state to escape liability under the rule of Mitchell v.
Rochester Railway.22  There, recovery was denied because the injury
was caused merely by a psychic stimulus, unaccompanied by immediate
physical injury. The court, in assuming that no physical impact had
occurred, permitted a recovery, notwithstanding an unaccounted-for
period of forty-five minutes.2 If time had elapsed between the fright
and the injury which resulted in death, the case would not fall under
any of the recognized exceptions to the Mitchell decision.24 Nor was
the state permitted to escape liability under the principle laid down in
Cook v. Village of Mohawk,2 5 where the reaction to the stimulus was
merely idiosyncratic. The decedent, in the principal case, being sub-
ject to hypertension and diabetes, died of a subarachnoid hemorrhage.
The uncontradicted medical testimony showed that the hemorrhage
was induced by fright. Thus, it would appear that the instant deci-
sion is inconsistent with the Cook case.
Although this decision does not extend a sovereign's liability into
areas of negligent omission in the performance of a governmental
function, it does show a tendency of the Court of Claims to favor the
innocent victim in a situation where a doubt must be resolved. Thus,
had the Court found that the psychic injury occurred immediately
19 Murrain v. Wilson Line, Inc., 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1st
Dep't 1946), aff'd mein., 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947) ; Schuster v. City
of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
20 Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945) ; see H. R.
Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928) (failure
of independent contractor, employed by city, to furnish sufficient water pressure).
21 See Steitz v. City of Beacon, supra note 20; St. George v. New York,
283 App. Div. 245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147 (3d Dep't 1954) ; Murrain v. Wilson Line,
Inc., supra note 19. In cases involving treatment accorded inmates of mental
institutions, the courts have hesitated in imposing liability. This caution stems
from a desire not to return to high fences and steel bars as a preventive measure
for occasional elopements by trusties. To hold the state liable in cases such
as Excelsior Ins. Co. v. New York, 296 N.Y. 40, 69 N.E.2d 553 (1946), would
seriously hinder modern trends in the psychiatric rehabilitation of these inmates.
22 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).23 See Williams v. New York, 204 Misc. 843, 844-845, 126 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326
(Ct. Cl. 1953).
24 See McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST.
JonN's L. REv. 1, 32 (1949).
25207 N.Y. 311, 100 N.E. 815 (1913).
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upon the entry of the escaped convict into the decedent's truck, a re-
covery would have been allowed under a recognized exception to
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway, that is, immediate physical injury.2 6
On the other hand, had the injury occurred at any subsequent time
within the unaccounted-for forty-five minute period, recovery would
have been denied. But whether liability was imposed because the in-
jury was immediate or whether a new exception has been added to
the Mitchell rule does not clearly appear.
It is submitted that the Court should limit the immunity of the
state when liability arises from a breach of the aforementioned con-
cept of duties owed to the general citizenry, for which no liability is
imposed, by allowing recovery where a foreseeable harm to a par-
ticular individual or group of individuals is involved.
One of the primary reasons for requiring immediate physical in-
jury to permit recovery for psychic injury was to discourage litiga-
tion of unfounded claims where there existed a lack of evidence show-
ing a causal relationship between the act complained of and the injury
itself. However, with the recent advancements in medico-legal proc-
esses, the evidentiary obstacles may be more easily surmounted. It
would appear, therefore, that the courts should abandon the require-
ment of immediate physical injury where the stimulus is only psychic
in nature.
X
WILLS - INCLUSION OF TOTTEN TRUST IN TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION DEEMED CONFIRMATION.-Testator opened a bank ac-
count in his own name in trust for his secretary. The same account
was later bequeathed to the secretary. The widow, exercising her
right of election, sought contribution from the bank account, claiming
it to be part of the estate under the will. The Surrogate held that
the bank account is not subject to the widow's right of election be-
cause the will was a confirmation of the trust, not a revocation.
Matter of Phipps, 125 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
In 1904, the celebrated case of Matter of Totten upheld the
validity of a deposit ". . . by one person of his own money, in his own
name as trustee for another . ,, 1 Such a deposit, commonly re-
ferred to as a Totten trust, is tentative in nature. It does not become
absolute until the gift is completed during the depositor's lifetime by
26 Mundy v. Levy Bros. Realty Co., 184 App. Div. 467, 170 N.Y. Supp. 994
(2d Dep't 1918); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.
Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914).
1179 N.Y. 112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904). See the discussion of these
trusts in 1 Scorr, TRusts 360 (1939).
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